Schizotypal Perceptual Aberrations of Time: Correlation between Score, Behavior and Brain Activity by Arzy, Shahar et al.
Schizotypal Perceptual Aberrations of Time: Correlation
between Score, Behavior and Brain Activity
Shahar Arzy1,2*, Christine Mohr3,4, Istvan Molnar-Szakacs1, Olaf Blanke1
1 Laboratory of Cognitive Neuroscience, Brain Mind Institute, Ecole Polytechnique Fe´de´rale de Lausanne (EPFL), Lausanne, Switzerland, 2Department of Neurology,
Hadassah Hebrew University Hospital, Jerusalem, Israel, 3Department of Experimental Psychology, University of Bristol, Bristol, United Kingdom, 4Department of
Psychology, University of Lausanne, Lausanne, Switzerland
Abstract
A fundamental trait of the human self is its continuum experience of space and time. Perceptual aberrations of this spatial
and temporal continuity is a major characteristic of schizophrenia spectrum disturbances – including schizophrenia,
schizotypal personality disorder and schizotypy. We have previously found the classical Perceptual Aberration Scale (PAS)
scores, related to body and space, to be positively correlated with both behavior and temporo-parietal activation in healthy
participants performing a task involving self-projection in space. However, not much is known about the relationship
between temporal perceptual aberration, behavior and brain activity. To this aim, we composed a temporal Perceptual
Aberration Scale (tPAS) similar to the traditional PAS. Testing on 170 participants suggested similar performance for PAS and
tPAS. We then correlated tPAS and PAS scores to participants’ performance and neural activity in a task of self-projection in
time. tPAS scores correlated positively with reaction times across task conditions, as did PAS scores. Evoked potential
mapping and electrical neuroimaging showed self-projection in time to recruit a network of brain regions at the left anterior
temporal cortex, right temporo-parietal junction, and occipito-temporal cortex, and duration of activation in this network
positively correlated with tPAS and PAS scores. These data demonstrate that schizotypal perceptual aberrations of both
time and space, as reflected by tPAS and PAS scores, are positively correlated with performance and brain activation during
self-projection in time in healthy individuals along the schizophrenia spectrum.
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Introduction
A fundamental trait of the human self is the continuous mental
projection to different points in time in order to re-experience past
events and predict future occurrences [1,2,3]. This is related on
cognitive functions including episodic memory [4], future
prediction [5,6] visual imagery [7] and ‘‘mental time travel’’ [8].
The projection of the self along time allows the self to act as
‘‘observer, agent, and guardian of the continuity of experience’’
[9] (p. 161). Continuity of the self in space is also fundamental for
human cognition, and mental ‘‘projection’’ of the self to the so-
called ‘‘third person perspective’’ is essential for cognitive functions
such as agency, self–other distinction, and mental own-body
imagery [10,11,12,13]. The similarity between this magnitudes of
space and time with respect to the experiencing self has been
recently stressed [14,15]. Disturbances in this spatial and temporal
unity of the self is a major characteristic of schizophrenia spectrum
disorders – including schizophrenia, schizotypal personality
disorder and schizotypy [16,17,18,19,20,21,22,23,24,25,26]. Ac-
cordingly, high frequency of spontaneously experienced schizoty-
pal perceptual aberrations with respect to body and space, as
measured by the Perceptual Aberration Scale (PAS) [27], have
been considered an indicator of psychosis-proneness [28,29,30]. In
view of this, we have previously found PAS scores to be positively
correlated with behavior and duration of temporo-parietal
activation in participants performing a task involving self-
projection in space [25,31], in agreement with other neuroimaging
studies, showing higher temporo-parietal activity during space-
related tasks (such as agency or visual perspective taking)
[24,31,32,33,34]. However, not much is known about perceptual
aberrations in time in people along the schizophrenia spectrum, as
well as the relationship between these ‘‘temporal’’ perceptual
aberrations and neural activity [35,36].
To this aim, we first composed a temporal Perceptual
Aberration Scale (tPAS; Table 1) similar to the abovementioned
PAS scale [37,38]. The tPAS was, secondly, tested in a large group
of 170 healthy participants. We thirdly compared tPAS and PAS
scores to participants’ performance in a smaller group of 14
participants performing a self-projection in time task, as reported
previously [3], and fourthly, compared tPAS and PAS scores to
participants’ brain activity as measured by electrical neuroimaging
during task performance. The task asked participants to imagine
themselves at three different time-points: Now (the present time-
point), Past (10 years earlier than the present time-point), or Future
(10 years later). In separate blocks for the Now, Past, and Future
time-points, participants were shown a series of different events
(personal (e.g. first child) or non-personal (e.g. Obama’s election)
on a computer screen. They were asked to indicate if the presented
event took place before (Backwards in time) or after (Forward in
time) the currently imagined time-point. Accordingly, we labelled
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this latter behaviour relative self projection, whereas the projection
to past, now or future points was labelled absolute self projection
(Figure 1A). Regarding our previous results showing positive
correlation between PAS scores and behaviour and brain activity
in self-projection in space, as well as the similarity between self
projection in time and space [1,3,12,15,23,31], we hypothesized
that performance and brain activity in this self-projection in time
task will be correlated with level of spontaneously experienced
schizotypal perceptual aberrations in space and time as measured
by PAS and tPAS scores.
Results
Behavioural testing of the temporal Perceptual
Aberration Scale (tPAS)
Analysis of results obtained from the 170 participants for the
whole sample showed a significant positive correlation between
PAS and tPAS scores (r = 0.57, p,0.001, two-tailed). This suggests
that participants performed similarly in the PAS and tPAS. The
same correlation conducted for women and men separately
showed this correlation to be evident for each sex (men: r = 0.54,
p,0.001; women: r = 0.60, p,0.001). Independent t-tests showed
that neither the mean tPAS score, nor the mean PAS score
differed (tPAS: t168 = 1.10, p = 0.27, PAS: t168 = 1.65, p= 0.10)
between women (tPAS: 4.5561.27, PAS: 6.4965.58) and men
(tPAS: 4.3561.19, PAS: 5.2963.75).
tPAS and PAS Questionnaires
Mean tPAS score for the electrical neuroimaging group was
4.061.3. PAS score of 5.562.1 was comparable to those reported
in previous studies [25,27,31,39]. tPAS and PAS scores were
found to be correlated to each other (r = 0.72, p,0.01).
Task performance and questionnaire scores
Reaction times in the time task were significantly longer for Past
(mean6SD: 475.36137.1 ms) and Future (480.16154.1 ms) than
Now (401.16159.2 ms) events (F(2,26) = 12.5 p,0.001; Figure 1B)
[3,40]. tPAS scores correlated positively with reaction times across
task conditions (r = 0.69, p,0.01), as did the PAS scores (r = 0.68,
p,0.01; Figure 2A). With regard to accuracy, participants’ error
rates were higher in the Past and Future conditions than in the
Now condition (mean error rates: 9.265.2% (Past); 6.163.1%
(Now); 9.864.5% (Future); F(2,26) = 7.2, p,0.01). Accuracy rates
did not correlate with either tPAS scores (r = 0.16, p = 0.54) or
with PAS scores (r = 0.09, p = 0.79).
EP mapping and source localization
EP mapping of the group-averaged data revealed one microstate
of brain activation (time segment of stable voltage topography; EP
map) that lasted significantly longer for the Past (110.2612.3 ms)
and Future (105.0615.2 ms) conditions than the Now
(39.268.4 ms) condition as reported previously (F(2,26) = 3.8,
p= 0.03; Figure 1C) [3], comparable to the behavioural data
pattern, suggesting that this EP map is linked to self-projection in
time (time-map). No difference was found when statistical analysis
was performed on the amplitude (or GFP) of those EP maps
(F(2,26) = 0.6; p=0.56). A linear inverse solution (LAURA) [41]
localized the time-map to the left anterior temporal cortex, right
temporo-parietal junction, and occipito-temporal cortex (Figure 1D)
[40].
Table 1. Temporal Perceptual Aberrations Scale (tPAS).
Statement
1. I sometimes have the feeling that I have already been in a situation like the one I am currently in (de´ja` ve´cu).
2. I sometimes re-imagine experiences I had in the past.
3. I dedicate much time to planning my schedule.
4. I sometimes have the feeling of having already seen things that are presented to me (de´ja` vu).
5. I sometimes find myself dreaming awake.
6. I sometimes look upon myself from a future point of view.
7. I sometimes imagine myself as a younger child.
8. I sometimes have a dream in which I meet my past self.
9. I sometimes have a dream in which I meet my future self.
10. I sometimes think deeply about my old age.
11. I sometimes know what to do as I already predicted such a situation without previously experiencing it.
12. I sometimes feel that I am older than my current age.
13. I sometimes feel that I am younger than my current age.
14. I sometimes have the feeling that I know what is going to happen.
15. I sometimes regret key decisions I took in my life.
16. I am sometimes bothered by key decisions I have to make in the far future.
17. I sometimes believe that patterns or situations that have already happened will re-occur again.
18. I am sometimes not sure if some events had really occurred to me or were just imagined.
19. I sometimes feel sure when performing an action, although I have never done it before.
20. I am sometimes not sure if I did something that I had already done.
The 20-item tPAS scale, which was developed for measuring the frequency of schizotypal perceptual aberrations of time, is presented. Participants had to rate on a scale
from 1 to 10 how much these statements are true with respect to themselves, based on their own experiences (1 - not at all; 10 – very much).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0016154.t001
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Questionnaire scores and neural activation
Correlation analysis of tPAS and PAS scores with the duration
of the time-map for each subject revealed significant positive
correlations (tPAS: r = 0.59, p,0.05; PAS: r = 0.58, p,0.05;
Figure 2B), comparable to the relationship between behavioral
reaction times and tPAS and PAS scores. Neither tPAS nor PAS
scores were significantly correlated with the strength (or GFP) of
the time-map (tPAS: r = 0.44, p = 0.11; PAS: r = 0.43, p = 0.12).
The duration or the amplitude of no other EP map, before and
after the time-map, showed a significant correlation with these
scores. These data suggest that during the self-projection in time
task, the duration, but not amplitude (GFP) of neural activation, in
a specific time period (,350–500 ms after stimulus onset), within a
network including left anterior temporal cortex, right temporo-
parietal junction, and occipito-temporal cortex, is positively
correlated with schizotypal symptomatology, specifically temporal
and spatial perceptual aberrations as measured by tPAS and PAS
scores, respectively. These data suggest that schizotypal perceptual
aberrations of time and space are positively correlated with
behavioral performance and neural activation during a self-
projection in time task.
Discussion
Time, space and schizotypy
Impairment of self- and spatial-processing is a prominent
characteristic of disorders along the schizophrenia spectrum
[17,19,21,22,24,26,27,33,42,43,44,45]. However, although similar
Figure 1. Experimental design and results. (A). Stimuli and procedure. The three different self-projections in time (past, now, and future) are
shown. Participants were asked to mentally ‘‘project’’ themselves to one of these time-points, and from these time-points to judge whether different
self or nonself events (e.g., top row) already happened (relative past) or are yet to happen (relative future). (B) Behavioral data. Reaction times are
plotted separately for past (blue), now (red), and future (green) self-projections in time. Note the significantly higher results for past and future with
respect to the now. (C) From all EP maps, only one ‘‘time-map’’ was found to be significantly longer for past and future than for the now. Topography
and duration of this map for the three experimental conditions is shown. (D) Generators of the ‘‘time-map’’ were localized to the right
temporoparietal, occipitotemporal, and left anterior temporal cortices.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0016154.g001
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impairments might be related to the sense of a unified, coherent
self over time [23], such temporal aspects of self-processing have
received little empirical attention in schizophrenia. Specifically,
while several studies investigated temporal processing in the
seconds or minutes range [46,47,48,49,50,51], almost no attention
was paid to longer time periods. However, disturbances of time
consciousness in schizophrenia are not restricted to short time
scales, but appear to also involve binding together experiences
from one’s personal history over a time scale of years [52], often
referred to as ‘autonoetic awareness’ [8,52,53]. In a study to test
the hypothesis that patients with schizophrenia are unable to link
the separate aspects of events into a cohesive, memorable, and
distinctive whole, it was shown that such patients exhibited an
impaired recognition memory and a reduction in frequency of
autonoetic awareness relative to a control group [54]. A more
recent study found that patients with positive symptoms of
schizophrenia recalled fewer specific past events than did healthy
controls and were even more impaired in generating specific future
events [36]. Although not directly tested, these authors speculated
that such schizophrenic patients’ failures to process past and future
episodes might be related to disturbance of the sense of ‘‘subjective
time’’ in these patients, as well as to difficulties in episodic
memory, which has been assumed to be disturbed in schizophre-
nia [55,56,57,58,59]. The present data demonstrate that perfor-
mance and brain activation in a task of self-in-time positively
correlated not only with the degree of spatial perceptual
aberrations as reflected by PAS scores [25,31], but also with
temporal perceptual aberrations as reflected by tPAS scores. These
findings are in line with recent proposals that self-projection in
space and time share similar brain mechanisms [1,3,15].
Our EP data also showed that participants with higher tPAS
and PAS scores took longer to respond in a task involving self-
projection in time, and activated the right temporo-parietal
junction, the left anterior temporal lobe and the occipito-temporal
cortex bilaterally for a longer time. This is also in agreement with
studies of patients with schizophrenia revealing impairment in
temporo-parietal junction activity related to self-processing
[16,34,60,61]. Moreover, this activity was found to be positively
Figure 2. Correlations between reaction times, brain activation, and temporal and spatial perceptual aberration scale (tPAS, PAS)
scores. (A) tPAS and PAS scores as a function of reaction times in the self-in-time task. (B) tPAS and PAS scores as a function of duration of activation
of the time-map as measured by electrical neuroimaging. Note that this correlation parallels the correlation between the behavioral results and the
tPAS and PAS scores.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0016154.g002
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correlated with Schneiderian scores of schizophrenia [24,33].
However, whereas earlier studies suggested that pathological
temporo-parietal junction activity was due to changes in strength
of activation, the present data suggest that increased temporo-
parietal junction activity was due to longer, but not stronger
temporo-parietal junction activation [31].
The current findings may be explained by several neural
mechanisms that have been put forward to account for prolonged
brain activation patterns. David et al. [62] proposed that increases
in duration of activation may depend on the increased
contribution of top–down connections, reflecting re-entry of
neural signals to lower-level processing areas, as EPs were found
to be more enduring and dispersed in higher level areas [62]. This
is particularly true with respect to late EP components [62], like
the time-map that we found for the time period between 350 and
500 ms after stimulus presentation. The prolonged activity found
in the present study might thus reflect atypical processing in a
network of brain regions at the anterior temporal, temporo-
parietal and occipito-temporal cortex related to altered top–down
signals in subjects with high schizotypy scores. Alternatively,
prolonged activation at these regions may also be due to an
increase of independent simultaneous brain processes and/or
degraded functional connectivity between these regions
[63,64,65].
Schizotypal perceptual aberrations of space and time
and their neural mechanisms
Our data suggest that the relative impairment in self-projection
in time in healthy participants scoring high on positive schizotypy
may be related to atypical processing within the described
network. It has been proposed that brain function might be
broadly divided into an ‘extrinsic’ system, processing stimuli
delivered from the external environment, and ‘intrinsic’ system,
related to mental processing of one’s body and self
[26,66,67,68,69,70,71]. This latter system is overlapping with
the neural network found here for self-projection in time [66,72].
It was hypothesized that a major role of the intrinsic system is
simulation of one’s probable future, through episodic thinking and
comparison of past memories and future predictions
[8,68,73,74,75]. Research on schizophrenia and schizotypy has
found as well aberrations in processing of past memories and
future predictions: patients with schizophrenia have been shown to
exhibit impaired recognition memory and a reduction in
frequency of autonoetic awareness suggesting an impairment in
linking the separate aspects of events into a cohesive, memorable,
and distinctive processing of subjective time in schizophrenia [54].
The current data refine these findings further by showing
significant and coherent variability in self-projection in time to
past and future in individuals along the schizophrenia spectrum.
In conclusion, the present study demonstrates that self-
projection in time as reflected by behavioral measures as well as
duration of activation in a network of brain regions including left
anteroior temporal, the right temporo-parietal and bilateral
occipito-temporal cortex, are positively correlated with degree of
schizotypy, as measured by tPAS and PAS scores. These results
suggest that individuals with increased levels of schizotypy are
relatively impaired in self-relevant processing of space and time.
Materials and Methods
Questionnaires
Participants completed the 20-item tPAS scale (Table 1), which
was developed for measuring the frequency of schizotypal
perceptual aberrations of time. Typical items of the tPAS scale
are ‘‘I sometimes re-imagine experiences I had in the past’’ and ‘‘I
sometimes have the feeling that I know what is going to happen’’.
Participants had to rate on a scale from 1 to 10 how much these
statements are true with respect to themselves, based on their own
experiences (1 – not at all; 10 – very much). In addition, they
completed the 35-item true–false self-report PAS [27]. Typical
items of the PAS are ‘‘Occasionally I have felt as though my body
did not exist’’ and ‘‘Occasionally I have the impression that one of
my body-parts is bigger than usual’’ [28,29,30]. Participants also
completed the standardized handedness questionnaire [76] and
were asked about their previous neurological or psychiatric
history.
Participants
Behavioural study: 170 healthy volunteers (85 women) aged
20.8264.62 years (mean6sd; range 18–47 years) were asked to
complete the tPAS (Table 1) and PAS questionnaire [27]. Half of
the participants were undergraduate students receiving course
credit for their participation, while the remaining participants
were undergraduate students from various faculties at the
University of Bristol, UK. The affiliation of the latter participants
remained anonymous, since each undergraduate student of the
local psychology department was only asked to recruit an
additional undergraduate student of the opposite sex in order to
balance gender differences (70% of the psychology students were
women, see also [25] for a comparable test setting). Prior to the
experiment, which was approved by the local Ethical Committee
of the University of Bristol, all participants provided written
informed consent. Testing took place in groups of 5–10 in the
classroom.
Electrical neuroimaging study: Fourteen healthy volunteers
(seven males, aged 29–38 years; 31.562.9 years) participated in
the behavioural and EEG experiment, as reported previously [3].
All participants were right handed, and had normal or corrected to
normal vision and no history of neurological or psychiatric
disorders. All participants gave written informed consent before
inclusion in the study, which was approved by the Ethical
Committee of the University Hospital of Geneva (Switzerland).
Paradigm
The present study is based on a new analysis of data previously
collected and published [3]. Only the most relevant description of
paradigm and key results is provided here. Participants were asked
to ‘‘project’’ themselves to three different time-points: now (the
present time), past (10 years in the past), or future (10 years in the
future). In separate blocks for the past, now, and future, two-word
phrases describing different common events from personal life
(e.g., driver’s license; first child) or non-personal world events (e.g.,
Challenger explosion; Obama’s elections) were presented on a
computer screen (Figure 1A). Participants were asked to indicate
whether the presented event took place before (relative past) or
after (relative future) the currently imagined time-point (Figure 1A).
Stimuli were designed to be in the range of 615 years of the
imagined time-point. Judgments were given using index and
middle fingers of the left and right hand in alternating blocks as a
button press on a serial response box. Participants were instructed
to respond as quickly and precisely as possible while maintaining a
mental image of themselves in the appropriate time-point (past,
now, or future), which were performed in six blocks (each repeated
once) and counterbalanced across subjects. Each block included
120 stimuli, equally distributed among four groups: self (personal
events) in relative past, self in relative future, non-self (world
events) in relative past, and non-self in relative future, appearing in
random order.
Schizotypal Perceptual Aberrations of Time
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Analysis of behavioral data
Repeated measures ANOVAs were run on reaction times and
accuracy with Time (Past, Now and Future) as the repeated
measures factor. Then, to test possible relationships between
individuals’ questionnaire scores and task performance, separate
correlation analyses were performed between participants’ reac-
tion times and accuracy results and their questionnaire scores on
tPAS and PAS. These were performed for the whole sample, using
Pearson product moment correlations. All p-values are two-tailed,
and the significance level was set to a=0.05.
Electroencephalography (EEG) recording and evoked
potential (EP) mapping
Continuous EEG was acquired with a Bio-Semi system (Bio-
semi, Inc., Netherlands) from 192 scalp electrodes (impedances
,5 kV; vertex referenced; 2048 Hz digitization; band-pass filtered
0.1–100 Hz) in a darkened, electrically shielded booth. Epochs of
EEG (from 0 to 800 ms post-stimulus onset) from trials yielding
correct responses were averaged for each of the three experimental
conditions (Past, Now and Future) and for each subject to calculate
the EPs [77]. In addition to the rejection of sweeps where any
channel exceeded the amplitude of 6100 mV, the data were
visually inspected to reject epochs with blinks, eye movements, or
other sources of transient noise. EPs were band-pass filtered (1–
40 Hz) and recalculated against the average reference [77]. The
192-channel EP analysis was based on the examination of the
spatial variations of the voltage distribution over time and between
conditions, an approach known as microstates EP mapping
[77,78,79,80,81,82]. This approach searches for time segments
of stable map topography that represent functional microstates of
the brain during information processing. EP microstate segments
were defined by using a spatial k-means cluster analysis to identify
the dominant map topographies in the group-averaged evoked
potentials across the experimental conditions over time. The
optimal number of these template maps is determined by a
modified cross-validation criterion [78,79,80,83]. In a second step
the presence of a given EP map as identified in the group-averaged
data was verified statistically in the EPs of the individual subjects.
EP maps were competitively fitted to the EPs of the individual
subjects. This allows determination of the duration (number of
time-points that were assigned to one microstate map) and the
amplitude (or global field power, GFP) of a given EP map for each
condition across subjects. These duration and GFP values for a
given EP map then can be subjected to statistical analysis.
Statistical comparisons were performed on the duration and GFP
of each map (dependent variable) in the individual EPs using
repeated measures ANOVAs, with Time as the repeated measures
factor. Then, to test possible relationships between individuals’
questionnaire scores and the measured brain activity, the
respective mean durations and GFP of the different EP maps for
the individual subjects were correlated with participants’ tPAS and
PAS scores. For each EP map, separate correlation analyses were
performed (for duration and GFP) for both questionnaire scores.
These were performed for the whole sample, using Pearson
product moment correlations. All p-values are two-tailed, and the
significance level was set to a=0.05.
Source localization
The neural generators for a given mean EP map were estimated
by using a distributed linear inverse solution, based on a local
auto-regressive average (LAURA) model [41]. LAURA selects the
source configuration that tries to mimic the biophysical behavior
of electric vector fields (i.e., activity at one point depends on the
activity at neighboring points according to electromagnetic laws).
The solution space was calculated on a realistic head model that
included 4024 nodes, selected from a 66666 mm-grid equally
distributed within the gray matter of the Montreal Neurological
Institute’s average brain.
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